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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 
135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015). 
 
Synopsis 
 
A woman made a complaint to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Mach Mining, LLC (Mach) 
had refused to hire her as a coal minor because of her sex.  The 
EEOC is required to make an attempt at conciliation to end the 
discriminatory conduct prior to filing suit.  Mach claimed that the 
efforts for conciliation by the EEOC were not made in good faith.  
The EEOC argued that the two letters it sent show sufficient efforts, 
and that their efforts are not subject to judicial review.  The federal 
district court ruled that the court could review the EEOC’s 
conciliation efforts.  The Seventh circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision, saying that the conciliation efforts were unreviewable.  
The Court granted cert. and reasoned that Congress had created a 
“mandatory duty” for the EEOC to try for conciliation prior to filing 
suit.	  Courts regularly enforce this type of prerequisite.   
 
Background 
 
The EEOC investigated a sex discrimination claim made against 
Mach.
  This case involved a woman who filed a complaint with the 
EEOC, alleging that she was not hired as a coal minor because of her 
sex.  The EEOC must try to amend the illegal employment practices 
prior to filing suit for employment discrimination under Title VII of 
                                                            
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2015). 
 Id. at 1649.  
 Id. at 1647.  
 Id.  
 Id.  
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1647 (2015). 
	 Id. at 1651. 

 Id. at 1647. 
 Id. at 1650.  
 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Mach was invited to “participate in 
informal conciliation proceedings” and notified that an EEOC 
representative would come to start the process.  A total of two 
letters were sent to Mach, but the record did not show any other 
attempts by the EEOC for conciliation.  A year after the first letter 
was sent, the EEOC brought suit against Mach in federal district 
court.  Mach claims that the EEOC did not approach the 
conciliation process in good faith before filing suit.  The EEOC 
claimed that its conciliation attempts were not subject to judicial 
review and that the two letters it sent were sufficient proof of its 
attempts regardless of review.  The federal district court determined 
that it had the ability to review whether the EEOC’s efforts were 
adequate.  The Seventh circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.	  It reasoned that the conciliation efforts were 
unreviewable because the provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 “entrusts conciliation ‘solely to the EEOC’s expert 
judgment’” and does not provide a standard for any judicial review.
  
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
The Court reasoned that Congress does not usually prevent courts 
from “enforcing directives to federal agencies.”  There is a “strong 
presumption” in favor of such judicial review when administrative 
actions are in question.  The presumption of judicial review is 
rebuttable if it is seen that Congress intended for the agency to be 
self-policing, but it is difficult for the agency to prove that it was 
                                                            
 Id. at 1647. 
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1647 (2015). 
 Id. at 1650. 
 Id.  
 Id. 
 Id.  
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2015). 
	 Id. at 1647.  

 Id. at 1650. 
 Id. at 1651.  
 Id.  
 
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designed to self police its actions.  The Court then affirmed the 
mandatory duty of the EEOC to make a concerted effort to facilitate a 
conciliation agreement and to only file suit once the efforts have 
absolutely failed.  The enforcement of prerequisites for similar Title 
VII claims is commonly left to the Court.  Representatives of the 
EEOC made the argument that no standard criteria had been 
established to review the efforts of the EEOC towards conciliation.  
However, the Court affirmed its view that, although the EEOC has 
discretion as to how conciliation is attempted, Congress has not 
allowed the EEOC to have no review.  The statute did establish 
enough criteria in order to judge whether there has been satisfaction 
of the prerequisites.  The criteria under §2000e-5(b) includes 
“concrete standards,” which show that the endeavor to conciliation 
must include informal communication, conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.  
The parties’ second dispute revolved around what scope of 
judicial review the Court should afford the EEOC.	  The 
Government argued that, if there is to be some form of judicial 
review, that the courts only rely on the “facial examination” of 
provided EEOC documents.
  Mach argued that there should be a 
very intrusive review, similar to the way judges oversee bargaining 
between unions and employers.  The Court decided that there 
should be a middle ground standard that still allows the EEOC 
discretion in how to carry out the conciliation process but ensures 
that the employer is given a chance to  “discuss and rectify” any 
practice that is discriminatory.  If an employer provides evidence in 
an affidavit that the EEOC did not make a good faith effort towards 
                                                            
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015). 
 Id.  
 Id.  
 Id. 
 Id. at 1652.  
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1652 (2015). 
	 Id. at 1653. 

 Id.  
 Id. 
 Id.  
 
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conciliation, then the court must look at the facts of the case.  
Otherwise, a sworn affidavit from the EEOC that states that it has 
fulfilled its obligations and conciliation efforts failed will be 
sufficient proof for the court that the conciliation attempt 
requirements are met. 
 
Impact 
 
The Court in this case refused to blindly give Chevron deference 
to the EEOC in this case.  This reestablished that Chevron deference 
is given on a case-by-case basis with the intent of Congress 
considered for each agency.  The EEOC is still given a large amount 
of discretion and its efforts of conciliation are granted flexibility.  
However, employers will now have more of a change to defend itself 
in a suit if it does not believe that it was given enough of a change for 
conciliation efforts to be completed.    
 
Mellouli v. Lynch,  
135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) 
 
Synopsis 
 
This case concerns the Petitioner, Moones Mellouli, who was 
convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia used to conceal a 
controlled substance under Kansas’s law.  After finishing his 
probationary period, Immigration and Customs Enforcement decided 
that the conviction was cause for removal of Mellouli from the U.S.  
He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) who 
confirmed the deportation.  The Eighth Circuit denied Mellouli’s 
petition of review and he was deported in 2012.  The BIA’s 
argument for deportation was that §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) allowed 
deportation for drug offenses under state laws that related to federal 
drug and drug paraphernalia laws, even if the actual conduct did not 
                                                            
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1655 (2015). 
 Id.  
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1981 (2015); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–
5709(b)(2). 
 Id. at 1982, 1984.  
 
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fall under the definitions of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia under §802, so long as the state laws overlapped with 
the federal law.  The Court found that a narrower interpretation of 
the term “relating to” should be used.  Without a narrower view, 
even minor drug offenses that are not criminalized by federal law and 
defined by federal law as qualifying for deportation could cause an 
alien to be treated harshly under the law and removed.	  The Court, 
therefore, reversed the prior ruling and determined that Mellouli’s 
deportation was incorrect.
  
 
Background 
 
Mellouli emigrated from Tunisia on a student visa in 2004 and 
was educated in the U.S., later becoming a teacher at the University 
of Missouri–Columbia.  He became a conditional permanent 
resident in 2009 and was made a lawful resident in 2011.  However, 
in 2010, Mellouli was arrested for the offenses of driving with a 
suspended license and under the influence.  Officers found four 
orange pills in his sock during the search incident to his arrest.  
Mellouli later identified the pills as Adderall, which is a controlled 
substance under Kansas state law and federal law.  He was charged 
with possession of drug paraphernalia and pled guilty to driving 
under the influence.  It was alleged in the complaint that he had 
“use[d] or possess[ed] with intent to use drug paraphernalia . . . [and] 
introduce[d] into the human body a controlled substance.”  Two 
years later, in February 2012, Mellouli had finished his probation.  
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers then arrested 
                                                            
 Id. at 1982.  
 Id.  
	 Id.  

 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2015). 
 Id. at 1984-85.  
 Id. at 1985. 
 Id.  
 Id. 
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015) 
 Id. 
 Id.  
 
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Mellouli and determined that he qualified for deportation because of 
his conviction under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  The deportation was 
ordered by an immigration judge, the BIA affirmed the ruling, and 
Mellouli was deported in 2012.	  The Eighth Circuit court denied the 
petition for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
   
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
The Court ruled that Mellouli’s conviction in Kansas under Kan. 
Stat. Ann. §21-5709(b)(2) did not trigger the deportation.  Under 8 
U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i), an alien may be removed if they are 
“convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the 
United states, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance.”  The substances that qualify are defined in §802 of Title 
21.  Although the Kansas offense was related to possession of a 
controlled substance, that law did not require the substance to be 
defined in 21 U.S.C §802.  However, Mellouli concealing the 
controlled substance in his sock would not be considered a drug 
paraphernalia offense under federal law because federal law 
considers the sale or commerce of drugs and drug paraphernalia to be 
criminal not only possession of the contraband.   
The Court first addressed the reasoning used by the BIA and 
Eighth Circuit to differentiate a possession and distribution offense 
from a drug paraphernalia offense.  A conviction under state law 
can only trigger removal of the alien if the crime is considered a 
removable offense under federal law.  The facts of the crime that 
                                                            
 Id. 
	 Id.  

 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015). 
 Id. at 1984.  
 Id.  
 Id. at 1985 
 Id. (The court continued to explain that drug paraphernalia under federal law 
does not include “common household or ready to wear items like socks” and 
instead looks for items chiefly intended for use in drug related activities. Id. at 
1985.) 
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015). 
 Id. at 1986.  
 
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lead to the conviction are not meant to be reviewed by the 
immigration courts, who instead use a categorical approach to focus 
on the legal question of what was established by the conviction.  
Under Paulus, Mellouli would not be a candidate for deportation 
because, in spite of the category of his conviction, the act was not 
criminalized under federal law.  The BIA used the rationale that 
any drug paraphernalia conviction, regardless of whether it is defined 
by § 802, should be considered a removable offense, even if mere 
possession of the substance is not.	  The Court clarified that the BIA 
used a conflicting interpretation of §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) than what 
Congress must have intended, causing even minor drug offenses to 
be treated as harshly as drug distributing or trade offenses.
  The 
BIA’s interpretation that “an alien is not removable for possessing a 
substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for 
using a sock to contain that substance” made no sense to the Court.  
The Court, therefore, denied deference to the BIA under the Chevron 
doctrine.  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s conclusion and added the 
reasoning that a conviction for paraphernalia possession under a 
state’s law “categorically relates to a federally controlled substance” 
as long as there is ‘“nearly a complete overlap’ between the drugs 
controlled under state and federal law.”  There was a heavy reliance 
on the statute’s use of the term “relating to” when determining if a 
drug offence in a state could be used for removal under federal law.  
Because this term is understandably vague, the Court felt that it was 
necessary to narrow the interpretation of the phrase.  The Court 
held that §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s meaning should be limited for removal 
purposes to substances defined in §802 and rejected the notion that 
                                                            
 Id. (The lack of review is due to the risk of burdening the system and 
establishing fairness and predictability in the immigration courts.)  
 Id. at 1987-88 (citing Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965)). 
	 Id. at 1988; The BIA relied on the reasoning in Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 
I. & N. Dec. 118 (2009). 

 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,1989 (2015).  
 Id. 
 Id.  
 Id. at 1990.  
 Id.  
 
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any offense related to drugs or drug paraphernalia could lead to 
deportation of an alien. 
 
Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
 
Justice Alito joined in the dissent.  The dissent argued that the 
court rejected the interpretations of §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) given by the 
BIA and the Eighth Circuit but it did not offer its own new 
interpretation.  Justices Thomas and Alito argued that the statute’s 
language supports the argument “that the overlap between state and 
federal drug schedules supports the removal of aliens convicted of 
any drug crime, not just paraphernalia offenses.”  This would mean 
that the term “referring to” would modify the meaning of what laws 
and regulations are considered instead of modifying the violations 
that would qualify for deportation.  The Government in the case 
argued that overlap between state and federal law allows enough 
connection to qualify an alien for deportation for any crime under 
state law that relates to the federal law even if not defined by federal 
law.	 
The dissent criticizes the court for not answering the question of 
what “relates” to federal law under the statute.
  A complete overlap 
between the laws may not be needed between what substances are 
controlled under state and federal law, but the dissent argues that 
enough of an overlap should mean that violation of the state law 
makes an alien removable even if their actual offense is not defined 
under the federal statute.  Therefore, the dissent concludes that the 
broader interpretation of the federal statute is necessary and that 
Mellouli was appropriately deported.	  
 
 
                                                            
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1991 (2015). 
 Id.  
 Id.  
 Id.  
	 Id.  

 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1992 (2015). 
 Id. at 1993. 
	 Id. at 1995.  
 
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Impact 
 
This case has a narrowing affect on the meaning of  
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  This has caused the termination or reversal of 
cases being judged on similar facts and reasoning in immigration 
courts.	  Future cases involving aliens convicted of state drug 
paraphernalia offenses will be less likely to lead to deportation of the 
aliens.  Attorneys with non-U.S. citizen clients facing state drug 
charges will have to consider whether the state definition of a 
controlled substance includes drugs or paraphernalia not included in 
the federal law in order to give effective representation.	   
 
Michigan v. E.P.A.,  
135 S. Ct. 2699, 192 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2015) 
 
Synopsis 
 
The Clean Air Act created regulatory programs to control the 
pollution sent into the air by factories and refineries.	  It was 
amended in 1990 to establish the National Emissions Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants Program in order to address power plants 
and the air pollution they cause.	  The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) interpreted the Clean Air Act to require it to consider 
regulation of power plants where it is “appropriate and necessary,” 
but disregarded consideration of the cost of the regulation because 
the Act did not specifically require the EPA to consider cost.	  
Twenty-three states sought the EPA’s regulations to be reviewed by 
the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit Court, challenging the EPA’s 
refusal to consider the large cost estimated under the program.  The 
District and Appellate courts found in favor of the EPA, and allowed 
                                                            
	 Michael Z. Goldman, The Real World Consequences of Mellouli v. Lynch, 
CRIMMIGRATION: THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION LAW (Jan. 
10, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/06/02/the-real-world-
consequences-of-mellouli-v-lynch/ 
	 Id.  
	 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q). 
	 Id. 
	 Id. 
 
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it to not consider costs when passing regulations for power plant air 
pollution.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case in 
favor of the States because the EPA had been unreasonable in not 
considering the cost of its regulations; therefore it was not granted 
deference under Chevron.	   
 
Background 
 
In order to reduce the air pollution caused by factories and 
refineries in the United States, the government passed the Clean Air 
Act.		  This Act established regulatory programs in order to control 
the air pollution caused by such stationary sources and moving 
sources like cars and airplanes.	
  The National Emissions Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program was one of the programs in the 
Act, established in its current form in the 1990 amendments, and is 
focused on regulating the stationary sources of emissions of more 
than 180 specific pollutants.	  The way the program applies to a 
source depends on how much pollution the stationary source emits.
  
Congress then established a unique process in order to determine 
whether and how to apply these programs to power plants.
  The 
EPA was instructed to perform a study to determine the likely 
hazards to pubic heath after applying the guidelines of the Act, then, 
if the agency determines that regulation is “appropriate and 
necessary,” the EPA may regulate power plants according to the 
Act.
  The EPA concluded in 2000 that it was appropriate and 
necessary to regulate power plants based on their emissions and 
                                                            
	 Id. at 2712 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
		 Id. at 2704. 
	
 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).. 
	 Id.  

 Id.  If a source emits more than ten tons of a specific pollutant or twenty-five 
tons of a mix of pollutants in a year, it is considered a major source of pollutants 
and must be regulated by the EPA.  However, stationary sources that emit less 
pollutants but have the risk of causing damage to human health or the environment 
are called area sources and must also be regulated by the EPA. Id. at 2705.  

 Id. at 2705. 

 Id.  
 
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inadequacies in the Act.  This conclusion was later confirmed in 
2012.
  However, the EPA indicated that the cost of regulation 
“should not be considered” in deciding whether power plants should 
be regulated.
  The Agency estimated that the benefits of reducing 
the air pollutants of power plants would be worth around four to six 
million dollars a year, but the costs of the programs under their 
proposed regulations would be $9.6 billion for the power plants.
  
The District and Appellate courts found in favor of the EPA, 
allowing it to not consider costs when passing regulations for power 
plant air pollution.
   
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
Congress laid out specific criteria for the EPA to use to determine 
if other sources of pollutants would be included in the program, but 
the power plants were treated differently.
	  Congress asked the EPA 
to regulate power plants only if it found that regulation was 
“appropriate and necessary” with no specific guidance as to what 
factors to consider.

  The phrase “appropriate and necessary” may 
be broad and up to interpretation, but the Court indicated that a 
federal agency may not fail to consider such an important aspect as 
cost.
  The Court conceded that there are situations in which cost is 
not a necessary consideration, but that it is not rational, much less 
appropriate, to enact regulations that cost billions of dollars for such 
a small amount of estimated benefit.  It is common practice for 
Agencies to consider cost; therefore, not considering cost would be 
unusual when deciding whether to impose regulations.  Under 
Chevron deference, agencies are able to choose a reasonable 
                                                            

 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015). 

 Id. 

 Id. at 2706.  The regulatory impact analysis took other pollutants not on the 
EPA’s list and considered the lowering of these emissions when it gave its 
estimated benefit value of $37-90 billion. Id.   

 Id. 

	 Id. at 2707.  


 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 

 Id 
 Id.  
 Id.  
 
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interpretation of ambiguous or vague statutes and courts respect that 
reasonable interpretation when considering the agency’s liability or 
actions.  However, the Court felt that, since other parts of the Clean 
Air Act discuss cost, that the purposeful disregard of that factor in 
consideration was not reasonable.   
 
Justice Thomas Concurring 
 
Judge Thomas concurred specifically with the Court’s 
interpretation and implementation of the Chevron deference 
precedent.  He agreed that the interpretation of Congress’s request 
that the EPA determine if power plant regulation was “appropriate 
and necessary” meant that the EPA was not meant to consider 
whether the cost of the regulation was unreasonable.  The limitation 
of the Chevron deference test was, to Justice Thomas, an extremely 
positive outcome of the ruling.  He noted that the Chevron 
deference should not allow federal agencies to act in an irresponsible 
manner when interpreting vague statutes.	  
 
Justice Kagen Dissent 
 
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined in 
the dissent.  The dissent argued that the EPA took many factors into 
consideration.
  The EPA estimated that the benefit, according to the 
list of pollutants it usually used, was worth $4 to $6 million but those 
amounts were shifted to a benefit worth $80 billion including the 
ability to prevent approximately 11,000 fewer premature deaths.   
The basic argument is that the EPA only must take the emissions in 
consideration to determine the appropriateness or necessity of the 
regulation and only after that analysis does the EPA consider the cost 
                                                            
 Id. at 2708. 
 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015). 
 Id. 
 Id. 
 Id. 
	 Id. 

 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2715 (2015). 
 Id.  
 
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benefit analysis. The dissent notes that cost was considered after 
the need for regulation as determined and that the EPA would have 
taken cost into account when drafting said regulation.  
 
Impact 
 
This case limited the scope of the Chevron deference given to 
federal agencies when interpreting ambiguous statutes.  The cost and 
burden of regulations should be considered as a factor in a majority 
of situations as is customary in determining whether regulations are 
necessary.  In this way, the reasonableness factor in the deference test 
has been affirmed and elevated in its consideration by the court.  
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,  
799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) 
 
Synopsis 
 
In 2005, the FTC began pursuing liability of companies with 
either inadequate cyber security to protect consumer’s data against 
hackers or companies that made false statements about their level of 
security.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp. was the target of hackers 
three times in 2008 and 2009.  The hackers successfully accessed 
personal information of approximately 619,000 consumers and 
managed to cause $10.6 million in fraud loss.  The district court 
denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, and the appeal was heard on 
two issues to show a failure to state a claim.  The issues raised 
                                                            
 Id.  
 Id.  
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 Id. Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC, 
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc., and Wyndham Worldwide Corp were all 
defendants in the case and are all referred to under the name “Wyndham” in the 
case.   
 Id. 
 Id.  
 
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were the FTC’s authority to regulate cyber security under 15 
U.S.C.S. §45(a) or (n)’s unfairness prong, and, regardless of the 
authority, whether Wyndham had had fair notice that its security 
precautions were inadequate under FTC guidelines.  The appellate 
court affirmed the district court’s ruling against the motion to 
dismiss.	  
 
Background 
 
The Federal Trade Commission Act was established in 1914, 
codified as 15 U.S.C. §45(a), prohibiting unfair business practices or 
“methods of competition in commerce.”
  The 1994 amendments 
codified §45(n), a three-step policy that had developed over the 
decades of how to judge whether a practice was indeed unfair.  
The development of cyber crime and reasonable industry standards 
for cyber security in business practices lead the FTC to begin filing 
cases against companies for not protecting consumers and for falsely 
misleading consumers regarding the company’s level of security in 
2005.  In 2008 and 2009, the computer systems of Wyndham 
Worldwide Corporation were hacked on three separate occasions.  
The personal information of approximately 619,000 consumers was 
accessed and compromised.  The cyber thieves successfully 
caused $10.6 million in fraud loss.  The FTC filed suit against 
Wyndham for violations of §45(a) in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona in June of 2012.  The case was then transferred 
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey where 
                                                            
 Id.  
	 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 

 Id. at 243.  
 Id.  
 Id. at 240. 
 Id. Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC, 
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc, and Wyndham Worldwide Corp were all 
defendants in the case and are all referred to under the name “Wyndham” in the 
case.   
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 Id. 
 Id. at 242.  
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Wyndham filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  The motion 
to dismiss was denied, but the court certified the decision on the 
claim of unfairness for interlocutory appeal.   
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
 FTC’s Regulatory Authority Under §45(a) or (n) 
 
The FTC has the ability to pursue cases against companies for 
unfair business practices under §45(a).	  The unfairness test in 
§45(n) has three factors: (1) substantial injury to consumers, (2) 
which could not be avoided by consumers and (3) is not outweighed 
by benefits.
  The statute further instructs the FTC to consider 
established public policies.  Wyndham claims that all three factors 
are necessary but not adequate by themselves, and that other 
requirements were necessary to be met in order for Wyndham to be 
liable.  The Court agreed that the three-factor test may be 
necessary but not independently sufficient; however, the Court was 
not persuaded by the alternatives Wyndham proposed.  It determined 
that the FTC had authority to regulate unfair practices of the nature in 
the case.  
 
 Fair Notice  
 
Wyndham next made the claim that it lacked fair notice of the 
law.  It claimed that it acted with the understanding that it needed 
ascertainable certainty of the FTC’s security standards.  Wyndham 
had the requisite notice in order to put security measures in place, 
                                                            
 Id.  
 Id. 
	 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2015). 

 Id. at 244. 
 Id.  
 Id.  
 Id.  
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 Id.  
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especially after the first instance of security breach.  Even though 
the standard of notice does not need to be as high in civil cases, as in 
criminal cases.  The Court determined that Wyndham could not claim 
that it lacked fair notice.  
 
Impact 
 
This case affirmed the FTC’s authority to pursue cases against 
companies; however, the three-factor test for unfair practices may be 
expanded in the future.  The issue of fair notice was still muddled by 
the case because Wyndham did not sufficiently argue the claim for 
fair notice. Wyndham claimed that there is no FTC interpretation of 
§45(a) or (n) that the court must defer to, and that the Court must 
interpret the statute itself and apply it to Wyndham’s conduct in the 
first instance.  Wyndham was not able to argue that it needed to 
know the standards with ascertainable certainty—it could only claim 
that it did not have fair notice of the meaning of the statute, which it 
did not do sufficiently.	 
 
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,  
799 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 
Synopsis 
 
A class action lawsuit was brought against JP Morgan Chase 
Bank for failing to detect a Ponzi scheme.
  Chase claimed that a 
portion of the documents the plaintiffs requested was shielded from 
discovery.  A magistrate judge reviewed the disputed documents 
and concluded that a “vast majority” was not shielded from discovery 
under and statute or regulation.  Chase’s request for an 
interlocutory appeal was denied by the district court, so Chase 
                                                            
 Id. at 250. 
 Id. at 258.  
 Id. at 259. 
	 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 259 (3d Cir. 2015). 

 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 Id.  
 Id. at 38. 
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initiated a mandamus proceeding to force the district court to declare 
fifty-five pages of the discovery documents shielded under the Bank 
Secrecy Act.  The appellate court did a de novo review of the 
documents in camera.  The court determined that the writ of 
mandamus was denied due to Chase’s failure to show clear 
entitlement to the relief sought.  
 
Background 
 
The plaintiffs in the case alleged that a Chase customer had used 
his accounts with the bank and a bank acquired by chase in order to 
run a Ponzi scheme.  A putative class action was brought against 
the bank for failure to detect and stop the Ponzi scheme.  The 
plaintiffs managed to acquire a large collection of records from 
Chase in preparation for litigation.  There was a dispute between 
Chase and the plaintiffs regarding whether the Bank Secrecy Act and 
similar regulations protected some of the documents from 
discovery.	  Notification of the dispute was sent to the Director of 
the Litigation Division for the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) but only the OCC filed an amicus brief in the district court 
with a review of the legal principles.
  However, the OCC refused 
to review the documents so a magistrate judge reviewed the 
documents in camera.  The district court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs and Chase filed a motion for mandamus proceeding hoping 
the appellate court would declare that the fifty-five pages of 
documents from discovery were shielded from discovery through the 
Bank Secrecy Act and other regulations.  
                                                            
 Id. at 38.  The Bank Secrecy Act is codified as 31 USC § 5318(g).  Id. at 37.  
 Id. 
 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 Id. at 38 
 Id.  
 Id.  
	 Id.  

 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 Id.  
 Id.  
 
544 	

 
 
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
In order to qualify for mandamus, the petitioner must prove that 
“there is a clear entitlement to the relief requested and that 
irreparable harm will likely occur if the writ is withheld.”  There 
are high standards for a writ of mandamus to be granted as it may not 
be a substitute for appeal and the threat of injury must be blatant.  
The “clear entitlement prong of the mandamus standard” calls for the 
court’s prudent analysis of the Bank Secrecy Act and related 
regulations, which pertain to the confidentiality of suspicious activity 
reports (SARs).  Although there is clear provision for confidentiality 
of certain documents and information, one of the regulations under 
the Act specifies that “the regulation should not be construed as 
prohibiting . . . [t]he disclosure . . . of . . . [t]he underlying facts, 
transactions, and documents upon which a SAR is based.”   The 
court also notes that case law has affirmed the rights of evidentiary 
privilege and unqualified discovery.  In the end, the documents 
Chase wanted shielded did not meet the standards necessary for a 
writ of mandamus under the Act or any of the regulations.  Chase still 
had less severe options in order to continue to seek protection for the 
documents, but the writ was denied.  Chase’s additional motion for 
sanction against the plaintiff’s council was also denied and the 
parties’ motion to file a joint supplemental appendix was granted.  
  
Impact 
 
The protection of the right of discovery is fundamental to the 
U.S. judicial system.  Although the protection of privileged and 
confidential information is extremely valuable, courts cannot be 
overbroad in its protections at the detriment of those who have been 
wronged or those wrongfully accused.  The court could not set the 
                                                            
 Id.    
 Id. at 39.   
 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2015). (citing 12 
C.F.R. §21.11(k)(1)(ii)(A)(2)).  
 Id. at 44. 
 Id. at 45. 
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precedent that a writ of mandamus could be used as a substitute for 
an appeal when an appeal and other methods of protection are 
available. 
 
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 
 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015) 
 
Synopsis 
 
The designers at Varsity Brands Inc. (Varsity) created designs for 
cheerleading uniforms, which it submitted to the Copyright Office.	  
Varsity had five registered copyrights that it claimed Star Athletica, 
LLC (Star) was violating by marketing similar designs.
  Varsity 
brought suit against Star for violation of the Copyright Act and 
Tennessee state-law pertaining to copyright and competition.  The 
district court ruled in favor of Star granting summary judgment on all 
federal matters regarding the Copyright Act and then dismissing the 
state-law claims without prejudice. The Court analyzed the 
separability of the designs from their utilitarian function and 
determined that the designed were copyrightable.  The Court 
remanded the case, allowed the state law claim to be reassessed, and 
allowed Varsity to adjust its claim to address the diversity 
jurisdiction that allowed the federal court jurisdiction.  
 
Background 
 
The design team at Varsity created designs for their cheerleading 
sportswear claimed that it held five copyrights filed with the 
Copyright Office in accordance to the Copyright Act.  The designs 
were made without looking at the functionality of the product, but 
                                                            
 Id.  
	 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2015). 

 Id.  
 Id. 
 Id. at 471. 
 Id. at 475.  
 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 Id. 474-75 (6th Cir. 2015); 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
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consisted of the arrangements and positions of shapes and colors.  
Star also produced uniforms for cheerleading.  Varsity claims that 
Star has violated its five copyrights by marketing outfits of similar 
design and brought suit under the Copyright Act and Tennessee’s 
laws against “unfair competition, inducement of breach of contract, 
inducement of breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy.”  
Star denied the charges and brought counterclaims against Varsity 
misleading representations to the Copyright Office.  Both parties 
moved for summary judgment.	  Star claimed that Varsity’s 
copyrights were invalid because (1) the designs are for useful items 
and are therefore not copyrightable and (2) the graphic, pictorial 
and/or sculptural were not separable from the uniform thus are also 
not copyrightable.
  Varsity claimed that its copyrights were valid 
because (1) the designs were “separable and nonfunctional” and (2) 
Star’s actions infringed its copyrights.  The district court ruled in 
favor of Star and granted summary judgment, dismissing the state 
law claims without prejudice.  
 
Analysis and Ruling 
 
In order to prevail on its Copyright infringement claim, Varsity 
must show that it owned a valid copyright in the designs and that Star 
copied the protectable parts of the work.  The first prong of the 
test, to establish the validity of a copyright, has five elements:  
(1) originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject 
matter; (3) a national point of attachment of the work, such as to 
permit a claim of copyright; (4) compliance with applicable statutory 
formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not the author) a transfer of 
                                                            
 Id. at 471. 
 Id. at 475.  
 Id.  
	 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2015). 

 Id.  
 Id.  
 Id. at 476.  
 Id. 
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rights or other relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as 
to constitute the plaintiff as the valid copyright claimant. 
The second prong of the test determines whether an infringement 
of the copyright occurred, and whether the copied portions of the 
material should have been protected under copyright law.  Varsity 
claims that the district court did not give deference to the Copyright 
Office’s decision that the material was protectable under copyright 
law, and that the district court used the wrong approach to decide 
whether the design was separable from the utilitarian aspects of the 
item.   
Copyright registration occurs at the discretion of the Copyright 
Office.  The court must give a presumption of validity in a judicial 
proceeding if the Copyright Office has granted a copyright 
registration.  Once the plaintiff shows that the work was registered 
before publication or within five years after publication of the work, 
the burden shifts to the defendant who may rebut the presumption by 
showing that the copyrights are invalid.  The Chevron doctrine 
grants deference to executive agencies that Congress delegated the 
authority to implement provisions.	  The Copyright Office was 
delegated such responsibilities, but the Court determined that it 
should be granted deference under the Skidmore deference more than 
the Chevron deference because the delegated power is not to make 
law.
  
The court must determine whether or not the article is useful and 
whether the aesthetic designs are separable from the utilitarian 
aspects of an item.  Separability from the utilitarian aspects of an 
item is determined in two ways, by looking at its physical 
separability and its conceptual separability.	  The physical 
                                                            
  Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 Id. 
 Id. at 477. 
 Id. 
 Id. 
	 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  

 Id. at 479; Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 Id. at 481. 
	 Id. 
 
548 	

 
 
separability test is considered along with whether the “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features of an article are conceptually 
separable” because the physical test is limited.	  Of the multiple 
approaches used by courts, the Court decided upon a hybrid approach 
used by the Second and Fourth Circuits, which determined that the 
decorative elements of clothing are separable from the function of a 
garment.	   The Sixth Circuit’s approach to identify pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works was determined to be the best 
approach.	  This approach is made up of asking multiple questions 
that are derived from the Copyright Act.	  These include what the 
utilitarian aspect of the item is, whether an individual viewing the 
design can identify the “‘pictorial, graphic or sculptural features’ 
‘separately from the utilitarian aspect of the useful article,’” and 
whether those features of the design can exist independently of the 
utilitarian aspects of the item.	  The court determined that, because 
Varsity’s designs were more similar to fabric designs than dress 
designs, they are protectable subject matter under the Copyright 
Act.	  Therefore, summary judgment was entered in Varsity’s favor 
on the issue of copyright protectability.		  
 The Court answered five questions to determine whether 
Varsity’s designs were protectable.  First, the Court determined that 
Varsity’s designed are “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” because they 
are two-dimensional works of art.	
  Second, the designs are for 
useful articles because they are designs for cheerleading uniforms.  
Third, The Court rejected Star’s arguments for the purported 
utilitarian aspect of a cheerleading uniform and found it to be an 
impermissible factor.	  The Court also denied that the decorative 
aspects of a cheerleading outfit are a part of the utilitarian aspect of 
the garment because it is well established that fabric designs are 
                                                            
	 Id. at 482.  
	 Id. at 487.  
	 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015). 
	 Id. 
	 Id. at 488. 
	 Id. at 493. 
		 Id. 
	
 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015).  
	 Id.  
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copyrightable.
  The fourth question was whether the pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural aspects of the garments could be identified 
separately from the utilitarian aspects of covering the body, wicking 
away moisture, and permitting free body movement.
  The Court 
determined that the designs could be separately identified because a 
plain white cheerleading outfit could complete the same functions 
separate from the graphic designs.
  Question five was whether the 
“arrangement of stripes, chevrons, color blocks, and zigzags” could 
exist independently of the useful aspects of the uniform.  The court 
reasoned that they were separable and copyrightable because the 
designs could be transferred to other items of clothing and were not 
solely tied to the cheerleading uniform.  
 The district court’s dismissal of the state law claims was based on 
the principle that a district court may refuse to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction on state-law claims if the federal questions over which it 
has jurisdiction have been dismissed.
  The court vacated the 
district court’s dismissal of the state-law claims for two reasons: (1) 
there was still a federal claim because the court held that Varsity’s 
designs are copyrightable graphic work, and (2) Varsity should have 
the opportunity to amend its complaint to satisfy the diversity 
jurisdiction requirements.
  Therefore, Varsity was granted the 
ability to bring the state claims again when the case was remanded.  
 
Impact 
 
The court used this case to identify what it considered the best 
approach to determine the validity of a copyrightable design for 
garments with a utilitarian aspect.  This ruling will create the ability 
to copyright uniforms, costumes, and other useful garments, thus 
precluding them from being widely copied.  This protects designers 
and encourages ingenuity and competition.   
 
                                                            

 Id. at 490. 

 Id. at 491. 

 Id.  

 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 493 (6th Cir. 2015). 

 Id. (The second reason is due to Star’s assertion that Varsity did not meet 
diversity jurisdiction because they did not state an amount in controversy or that 
the parties were diverse it its complaint.) 
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De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 
 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015) 
Synopsis 
 
The court made a ruling in Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales 
(Padilla–Caldera I ), 426 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2005) which 
was overruled by the Board of Immigration Appeals  (BIA) issued In 
re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).
  The ruling of 
Briones was applied retroactively to a petition by Mr. De Niz Robles 
for an adjustment of his citizenship status even though his application 
was submitted relying on the ruling in Padilla-Caldera I.
 The 
question before the court was whether an executive agency, with 
delegated legislative policy making authority, can overrule a rule that 
a judicial proceeding established.
	  Under Chevron, step two and 
Brand X, if a “statutory scheme administered by an executive 
agency” is ambiguous then the court must assume that Congress has 
delegated decision making to the agency and defer to the agencies 
policy choices even if they overrule precedent.

  These rules 
applied to the law when Mr. De Niz Robles’s application was denied 
because he was found inapplicable for adjustment of his status under 
§§1255(i)(2)(A) and 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).
  After analysis of the 
Constitution, views on retroactivity and the Bowen case, the Court 
focused on the Stewart Capital factors.  The same conclusion was 
reached with every test, that retroactivity does not apply, so the 
petition for review was granted and the case was remanded back to 
the BIA for proceedings consistent with the decision.  
  
Background  
 
The first statute passed that affected the case was the §1255(i), 
which gives the Attorney General the ability to change the status of 
illegal immigrants and grant them lawful residency.  The second 
                                                            

 De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015). 

 Id. at 1168. 

	 Id. at 1167.  


 Id. at 1167. 

 These statutes will be further explained in the description of the analysis.   
 De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 
  551
statute, § 1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I), limits this discretion by clarifying that 
those who have entered the US illegally more than once are unable to 
receive lawful residency unless they first have a ten-year waiting 
period outside of the U.S.  In 2005, the court ruled in Padilla–
Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla–Caldera I ) that §1255 trumped 
§1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I).  So, the Attorney General would still be able 
to have the discretion to adjust the citizenship status of those who 
applied.  Relying on this ruling, Mr. De Niz Robles decided to 
remain in the US and applied for an adjustment in his status.  His 
application sat in the process of being reviewed for years when the 
BIA passed In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) in which 
the BIA ruled that §1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I) was the statute that ruled and 
that the Attorney General had no ability to adjust a status and that 
this ruling applied retroactively.  Therefore, this ruling would be 
applied to the applications waiting for status adjustment or 
“retroactively.”   
The court was bound by the ruling of the executive agency under 
an exception define by the “step two” of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837  (1984) and 
the National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet 
Services (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967 (2005) case.  Together, these cases 
have created the rule that, “if a statutory scheme administered by an 
executive agency is ‘ambiguous’” the court must assume that 
Congress has delegated the ability to make policy decisions to the 
agency and requires the court to “defer to the agency's policy 
choice,” even if it overrules “preexisting and governing statutory 
interpretation” by the court.  The BIA finally ruled on Mr. De Niz 
Robles’s application in 2013, denying his application based on the In 
re Briones ruling.  Mr. De Niz Robles appealed the denial leading 
to the case at hand.   
 
                                                            
 Id.  
 Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir.) amended and 
superseded on reh'g, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2005) disapproved in later appeal 
sub nom. Padilla-Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011), as corrected 
(Mar. 22, 2011). 
 De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 Id.  
 Id.  
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Analysis and Ruling 
 
The question before the court was whether a ruling made by an 
executive agency could be applied retroactively.  The BIA denied 
that there is any retroactivity because the ruling on Mr. De Niz 
Robles’s application was far after its decision in In re Briones.  
Robles claimed that he had filed the petition in 2005 in reliance on 
the law at the time and he could have been out of the country for the 
necessary ten years if he had known to rely on §1255; therefore, the 
new law was applied to actions taken before its creation.
   
The Constitution is clear that the laws passed by Congress are 
prospective and cannot be retroactive under the principles of due 
process and equal protection unless they are expressly prescribed as 
being retroactive.  Judicial decisions, however, are presumptively 
allowed to be retroactive under the Constitution because they are 
rulings on past events.  Yet, the retroactivity of rulings by 
executive agencies was unclear.  The court concludes that the 
delegation of powers to the agency came from a legislative source 
and therefore must be treated as prospective.  The Court in 
Bowen held that an executive agency’s rulings should only be 
prospective unless allowed retroactivity by Congress.  The case 
analyzed how rule two in Chevron and Brand X can be reconciled 
with the decision against retroactivity.  The agency holds a judicial 
proceeding complete with briefs and arguments, which seems to 
indicate that a ruling would be treated like a judicial ruling complete 
with retroactivity because the agency is not changing a law as much 
as clarifying and interpreting a law’s meaning.  However, the 
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Court clarifies that step two in Chevron applies when an executive 
agency uses the ambiguity of a law to write new laws under its 
delegated powers.	  Therefore, Bowen supports the Court’s 
conclusion that there is no retroactivity because the acts of the BIA 
are a part of legislative rather than judicial proceedings, thus are 
prospective in effect.
  However, the Court did allow for the 
retroactivity of an executive agency’s decisions to be judged on a 
case-by-case basis to allow for some flexibility.  
A five-factor balancing test was established in the case Stewart 
Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.1983).  The 
Stewart Capital factors are for application on a case-by-case basis.  
The first factor is whether the case was one of first impression, which 
is irrelevant in this case.  The second factor asks whether the 
action or ruling of the executive agency is a sudden divergence from 
“well established practice” or if it is only trying to “fill a void in an 
unsettled area of the law.”  The third factor requires the court to 
ask whether and to what extent the party affected by the new ruling 
relied on a former law or ruling.  The fourth asks how much of a 
burden retroactive application of the agency’s decision would create 
for the petitioner.  Lastly, the fifth factor asks whether the agency's 
interest in retroactivity is more valuable. 
The Court concluded that the BIA's application of Briones to Mr. 
De Niz Robles’s application was retroactive.  This meant that 
those who had relied on the law as it was when they applied for 
change in their citizenship status, like Mr. De Niz Robles, were 
disadvantaged because they had already given up years towards their 
other option.  The Court valued the ability for the people to be able 
to rely on laws and for there to be constancy and dependence on the 
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way the law would be applied.	  It therefore found that the 
“principles underlying the law of retroactivity” were not in support of 
this action.
  The petition for review of Mr. De Niz Roble’s 
application was granted and the case was remanded to the BIA for 
further proceedings consistent with that decision. 
 
Impact 
 
This case excited immigration attorneys because it officially 
indicated that what the BIA had done was, in fact, retroactive 
application of its ruling.  It further confirmed that the policies against 
retroactivity and in favor of reliability in the law would be enforced 
even against government agencies.  This meant that rulings of the 
BIA could be rejected or appealed based on retroactivity in 
application of law.  Therefore, the immigrants who were caught 
between the two conflicting laws and relying on the one that allowed 
them ability to petition for status adjustment were allowed to 
continue to be applicable for status adjustment so long as their 
application was within a certain time around the newest ruling.  
This will likely cause a small influx of cases to be brought by those 
who were denied status adjustment through the retroactive 
application of the BIA’s ruling.  
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